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Religion and New Constitutions: Recent Trends of 
Harmony and Divergence 
Jeremy Patrick* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most remarkable global political trends of the past century is the 
spread of constitutionalism.1 With few exceptions, every country in the world has 
its fundamental premise and structure encapsulated in a written document 
purporting to guarantee the legitimacy of its rulers to its people and its 
sovereignty to other international actors. The thirst for constitution-making unites 
the East and West, the First and the Third Worlds, the former colonizers and the 
formerly colonized. Any governmental entity interested in drafting a new 
constitution faces no shortage of examples to draw upon. 
A potentially vexing and contentious issue for the drafters of new 
constitutions is the role of religion.2 More specifically, to what degree, if any, 
should the new constitution reflect and incorporate the religious beliefs of a 
majority of the population? Should a foundational document in a country with a 
clear majority faith but an element of religious diversity, however small, appeal 
as broadly as possible or primarily to its core constituency? The traditional 
answer provided in liberal constitutionalism is that of official governmental 
neutrality toward religion alongside special protection for the exercise of religion 
by private individuals and their faith groups.3 This approach is incarnated in 
constitutional texts by a variety of provisions, with guarantees of non-
establishment of religion, free exercise of religion, and equal protection of 
religion serving as popular choices.4 
 
1. Davis S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. 
REV. 1163, 1167 (2011) (“[I]t has become nearly universal practice for countries to adopt formal written 
constitutions.”). “Constitutionalism is the idea . . . that the government can and should be legally limited in its 
powers, and its authority or legitimacy depends on its observing these limitations.” Constitutionalism, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sep. 11, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entires/constitutionalism 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).   
2. See, e.g., Benjamin Berger, Understanding Law and Religion as Culture: Making Room for Meaning 
in the Public Sphere, 15 CONST. F. 15, 16 (2006) (“Law has struggled mightily, but it has never been able to 
resolve its tensions with religion. . . . [L]aw and religion have been locked in a durable tension.”). 
3. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the 
Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 56, 57 (1998) (“So a vital task of constitutional law is to 
strike reasonable balances between private freedom and public power: to draw lines demarcating the proper 
spheres of conscience and religious association, on the one side, and political authority, on the other.”). 
4. See Michael Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to 
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 311–14 (1986) (discussing, in the context of 
the United States Constitution, the convergence of non-establishment, free exercise, and equality principles). 
The popularity of these choices will be discussed in Section III infra. 
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In the context of religion, however, the traditional approach of liberal 
constitutionalism arguably faces a rival trend in what Larry Catá Backer calls 
“theocratic constitutionalism.”5 Backer writes: 
[A] number of groups have accepted the legitimacy of transnational 
constitutionalism as a disciplining force but have rejected the notion that 
such restraints can be the product of a secular global consensus. Among 
the most potent of these groups have been religious transnational 
constitutionalists who have argued that one or another of the current crop 
of universalist religions ought to serve as the foundation of normative 
disciplining of constitution making.6 
Theocratic constitutionalism may be reflected in constitution-making through 
the inclusion of provisions that explicitly align the nation-state with a particular 
faith, that offer legal or financial benefits to one or a small number of favored 
faiths, that adopt religious law as binding for certain types of disputes, or that 
provide roles for religious leaders in governance.7 Despite recent scholarly 
attention given to the constitutions of Iraq and Afghanistan,8 the influence of 
theocratic constitutionalism is not a phenomenon solely tied to predominantly 
Muslim countries: other faiths are reflected as well, such as the influence of 
Buddhism in the constitution of Bhutan and Christianity in the preamble to the 
constitution of the Cayman Islands.9 The degree to which various countries 
incorporate religious elements into constitutions can vary dramatically, from non-
binding ceremonial references in preambular recitations at one extreme to the 
 
5. Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering,  
16 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 85 (2009); see also Ran Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to 
Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L.  REV. 1179, 1188 (2008) (“At the uneasy 
intersection of two present-day trends—the tremendous increase of popular support for principles of theocratic 
governance and the global spread of constitutionalism—a new legal order has emerged: constitutional 
theocracy.”). 
6. Backer, supra note 5, at 91. 
7. See id. at 92 (“States engage with religion, as a formal matter, in different manners. Some states 
conflate legal and religious systems together. Some states sponsor or establish a religion. Others incorporate 
religious law as the law of the state. . . .”). 
8. See, e.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, Notes in Defense of the Iraq Constitution, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1117 
(2012); Intisar A. Rabb, “We the Jurists”: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527 (2008); 
Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1 
(2007); John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political 
Prescription, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 670 (2007); Nusrat Choudhury, Constrained Spaces for Islamic Feminism: 
Women’s Rights and the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 19 YALE J. L. & FEM. 155 (2007); J. Alexander 
Their, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 557 (2007); Jason L. Reimer, 
Finding Their Own Voice—The Afghanistan Constitution: Influencing the Creation of a Theocratic Democracy, 
Comment, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 343 (2006). 
9. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN July 18, 2008; THE CAYMAN ISLANDS (CONSTITUTION) 
ORDER 1972, July, 26, 1972; see also IRAQI CONSTITUTION Oct. 15, 2005 (establishing Islam as the official 
state religion); THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004 (noting the people’s belief in Islam in its 
preamble). 
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denial of political office and even citizenship to members of the non-established 
faith at the other.10 Although its particular effects may be lesser or greater, as a 
philosophical approach to constitution making, theocratic constitutionalism offers 
the possibility of basing a nation’s fundamental values on precepts tied to faith, 
revelation, and authority as opposed to the traditional liberal values of liberty and 
equality.11 
The notion that certain countries incorporate religious elements into their 
constitutions is not, by itself, particularly novel or noteworthy. What is worth 
exploring, however, is the extent to which theocratic constitutionalism has 
become a legitimate and visible rival to the traditional liberal constitutionalism 
drafting process. Constitutionalism has been enormously successful on a global 
scale, but what kind of constitutionalism? Has decolonization and a reported 
resurgence in religious fundamentalism led to a widespread invocation of 
theocratic constitutionalism, or do the tenets of liberal constitutionalism in the 
area of religion still hold sway?12 As Backer phrases it, “[i]s there now arising a 
theocratic constitutionalism in opposition to and competing with conventional 
constitutionalism for a place as one set, or the supreme set, of organizing 
principles for states?”13 
One approach to answering this question is anecdotal, involving a deep 
analysis of a small sample of recently enacted constitutions and drawing 
inferences from their contents. This is largely the approach taken by Backer.14 
However, a more systematic approach may bear fruit as well. In an impressive 
article that tracked and categorized the elements of every constitution from 1946 
to 2006, David Law and Mila Versteeg made an important point: “although it has 
become nearly universal practice for countries to adopt formal written 
constitutions, very little is known empirically about either the evolution of this 
 
10. Compare CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008 (“INVOKING the name of 
God and recognizing our diverse forms of religions and spirituality”) with THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004 (stating that the President must be Muslim); see also CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES 2008 Article 9(d) (forbidding citizenship to non-Muslims) and Articles 73, 109, 130, 
& 149 (forbidding non-Muslims from, respectively, the legislature, the Presidency, the Cabinet, and the 
judiciary). 
11. See Backer, supra note 5, at 121 (“Theocratic constitutionalism is grounded in notions similar to 
those that underlie transnational secular constitutionalism—that there is a set of universal values under the 
authority of which government is both constructed and limited.”). Backer goes on to discuss the universal 
values provided by religion. Id. at 121–35. 
12. Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales 1 
(Univ. Tor. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 04–08, 2009), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557601 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
13. Backer, supra note 5, at 92. The competing trends could arguably be seen as examples of Samuel 
Huntington’s controversial “clash of civilizations” thesis. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMARKING OF WORLD ORDER 28 (1996) (arguing that the most pivotal conflicts in 
post Cold War society will be between people of different cultures, not people of different social classes). 
14. See Larry Catá Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious Transnational 
Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 11, 13–14 (2007) (discussing the new constitutions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq). 
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practice or the content of the constitutions themselves.”15 The best approach for 
discerning overall patterns and broad trends is one that includes both qualitative 
and quantitative elements. 
This Article applies an empirical approach in an attempt to answer the 
question of whether liberal constitutionalism, theocratic constitutionalism, or 
some combination has become the dominant theory reflected in modern 
constitution making in the area of religion. Specifically, this Article analyzes 
every constitution enacted since the year 2000, sorting the provisions of each one 
into six categories that broadly fall within one of these two approaches. Part II of 
this Article explains the methodology of how constitutions were selected and the 
categories created. Part III applies this methodology and analyzes the results, 
while Part IV discusses the particular limitations of this project. Part V 
summarizes the results of the analysis and offers broad conclusions. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The research and analysis conducted for this Article took place as follows. 
First, each new constitution enacted by a nation-state since (and inclusive of) 
the year 2000 was examined. The choice of the year 2000 as a starting point to 
evaluate new constitutions is to some degree an arbitrary one, as would be the 
choice of any other year near that point in time. The date range chosen yielded 
over three-dozen examples, which is a sample size that appears sufficient to 
support broad inferences regarding global trends. Constitutions were included in 
the data set if they purported to be constitutions and set forth the basic law and 
structure of a country, even if those constitutions were not legally entrenched in 
the sense that legislation inconsistent with them would necessarily be invalid. 
One vexing aspect of determining whether particular constitutions fit into 
this data set was distinguishing between genuinely new constitutions and 
constitutions that were simply amended or revised and re-enacted. Because 
constitutions may be modified to varying degrees and in different ways, the 
determination of whether a constitution is a new constitution is, to some extent, a 
matter of judgment. This author has relied on press releases, newspaper accounts, 
and official nomenclature in deciding whether questionable candidates should be 
included. In four cases (Egypt, Libya, South Sudan, and Syria), constitutions that 
have not yet received final approval have been included on the rationale that they 
provide the most recent indication of trends in this area. The author hopes that 
mistakes, omissions, or the inclusion or non-exclusion of debatable examples will 
be few enough that the final analysis will not be significantly skewed. 
 
15. Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 1167; see also id. at 1168 (“It is unfortunate . . . that empirical 
questions about the content and evolution of the world’s constitutions have rarely been addressed by legal 
scholars.”). 
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The constitutions themselves were obtained from a variety of sources, with 
particular recourse made to Constitution Finder,16 a repository maintained by 
members of the University of Richmond School of Law community,17 
Constitutionmaking.org maintained by the Comparative Constitutions Project,18 
World Constitutions Illustrated on HeinOnline, Wikisource,19 and a variety of 
governmental and private websites. For constitutions not written in English or 
French, the author has relied on unofficial translations in some cases. 
Second, references to religion in each constitution were separated into the 
following six categories: Preamble, Ceremonial Deism, Established Religion, 
Religious Freedom, Equal Protection of Religion, and anti-Establishment 
Clause.20 Placement of a single provision into multiple categories was not 
uncommon. A description of each category and its placement on the spectrum 
between liberal and theocratic constitutionalism is provided in the Analysis 
section below. As with the determination of what constituted a new constitution, 
an exercise of judgment was sometimes necessary in determining the placement 
of particularly unusual or ambiguous provisions. 
Finally, the author created and organized a table by country and types of 
religious references present in its constitution, allowing for a basic quantitative 
evaluation of trends in the inclusion or exclusion of specific constitutional 
provisions relating to religion.21 This evaluation was then used as the empirical 
starting point for further analysis of the question of whether liberal or theocratic 
constitutionalism had attained predominant status, with more in-depth discussion 
of particular examples used as case studies. 
III. RESULTS 
Table 1, below, contains a list of every constitution that fit the criteria for this 
survey along with an indication of whether it contained provisions fitting into the 
designated categories. 
  
 
16. United States, CONSTITUTION FINDER, http://confinder.richmond.edu/index.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
17. Circumscription, CONSTITUTION FINDER, http://confinder.richmond.edu/circumscription.html (on 
file with the McGeorge Review). 
18. About Us, CONSTITUTION MAKING, http://constitutionmaking.org/about.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
19. WIKISOURCE, http://wikisource.org/wiki/Main_Page (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
20. Three additional categories labeled Religious Education, Religious Limitations, and Miscellaneous 
were used during the sorting phase, but discarded during the writing of this Article because they were 
insufficiently defined and cumulative of the other categories. 
21. The author recognizes that this method of evaluation is not necessarily statistically rigorous. 
However, it is hoped that what this analysis lacks in sophistication, it will gain in simplicity and clarity. As the 
great Saki said, “a little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation.” Hector Hugh Munro, Clovis on the 
Alleged Romance of Business, in THE COMPLETE STORIES OF SAKI 397 (Woodsworth ed., 1993). 
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TABLE 1:  LIST OF COUNTRIES & RELIGIOUS PROVISIONS. P=PREAMBLE, CD=CEREMONIAL DEISM, 
ER=ESTABLISHED RELIGION, RF=RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EC=(ANTI-) ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, 
EPR=EQUAL PROTECTION OF RELIGION 
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A.  Preamble 
The legal effect of language contained in preambles to constitutions varies 
from country to country. In a recent study of judicial interpretation of preambles, 
Liav Orgad noted: 
In many states, the preamble has been increasingly used to 
‘constitutionalize’ unenumerated rights. An international survey of the 
function of preambles shows a growing trend toward it having a more 
binding force, either independently, as a substantive source of rights, 
combined with other constitutional provisions, or as a guide for 
constitutional interpretation. The courts rely more and more on 
preambles as sources of law. While in some states this development is 
not new and dates back several decades, in others it is a recent 
development. From a global perspective, the U.S. Preamble, which does 
not enjoy binding legal status, remains the exception rather than the 
rule.22 
Orgad goes on to conclude that the legal effect of preambles falls broadly 
into three approaches: “ceremonial-symbolic” in which the preamble is given no 
binding force, “interpretive” in which preambular language is considered when 
the construction of ambiguous statutory provisions is required, and “substantive,” 
where the preamble is seen as an independent source of legal rights or 
limitations.23 
The insertion of religious language in preambles to new constitutions was 
quite common, as eighteen of the forty constitutions studied for this project 
included such language. Within this set of constitutions containing religious 
language in their preamble, the exact nature of the language used could differ 
dramatically. In Ecuador, for example, the Preamble includes a relatively short 
and open-ended statement stating that the constitution was made “INVOKING 
the name of God and recognizing our diverse forms of religion and 
spirituality….”24 In contrast, the Constitution of Afghanistan includes this 
passage: 
In the name of God, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful[.] Praise be 
to Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of Worlds; and Praise and Peace be 
upon Mohammad, His last Messenger and his disciples and followers. . . 
 
22. Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 714 (2010). 
23. See id. 
24. CONSTITUTION OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008 pmbl. 
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We the people of Afghanistan: Believing firmly in Almighty God, 
relying on His divine will and adhering to the Holy religion of Islam. . ..25 
It seems reasonable to assume that preambles with strong, sustained, and 
denominationally-focused references to religion are more likely to receive 
substantive legal consideration in domestic courts than those that merely contain 
passing references to a deity.26 However, whether passages like those above will 
be given ceremonial, interpretive, or substantive legal effect will, of course, 
depend upon the judiciary of each country. The uncertain legal effect of religious 
references in preambles is similar in nature to that of largely symbolic religious 
references in the body of constitutions. 
B.  Ceremonial Deisms 
“Ceremonial deism” is the label given to non-coercive, largely symbolic and 
ritualistic references to religion in legislation or government activity in the 
United States.27 Extending the idea to the constitutional context, ceremonial 
deisms are provisions or scattered references that invoke a divine being or 
religious concept for non-substantive effect.28 For example, under the 
Constitution of Bhutan, each session of Parliament concludes with the Tashi-
mon-lam,29 “prayers for fulfillment of good wishes and aspirations.”30 The 
Kenyan Constitution contains the full text of the national anthem, which begins 
“O God of all creation[,] Bless this our land and nation.”31 Most of the ceremonial 
deisms found in this study stemmed from oath requirements, such as “So help me 
God”32 and “I Swear by Almighty God.”33 Oath requirements with religious 
phrases could, if applied stringently, have coercive effects on atheists and 
members of minority religions or religious faiths that are opposed to the concept 
 
25. CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004, pmbl. 
26. However, even such passing references may give rise to sustained debate as to their meaning. See, 
e.g., Jonathon W. Penney & Robert J. Danay, The Embarrassing Preamble? Understanding the “Supremacy of 
God” and the Charter, 39 U. B.C. L. REV. 287, 288 (2006) (summarizing paucity of judicial attention given to 
the phrase “Supremacy of God” in the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and arguing 
that it should be given significant interpretive effect). 
27. See generally, Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism 96 COLUM. 
L. R. 2083, 2094–96 (1996) (referring to practices like prayer at the presidential inauguration and the role of the 
Bible in judicial oaths as belonging to a certain category of ceremonial deism). 
28. Id. 
29. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN July 18, 2008, art.10.6. 
30. Id. at 65 (Glossary to Official English Translation). 
31. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA Aug. 27, 2010, art. 9(2) (referencing Second Schedule, National Symbols, 
Part (b)). 
32. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF SWAZILAND July 26, 2005, Second Schedule. 
33. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF QATAR June 8, 2005, arts.10, 74, 92, 119. 
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of oaths. For the most part, however, these oaths apply only to persons assuming 
high office and presumably will have little practical effect.34 
Taken on their own, ceremonial deisms are far from an establishment of 
religion.35 Their presence and cumulative effect, could, nonetheless, lead a court 
to find that state neutrality toward religion is not required in particular contexts. 
Steven Epstein, writing in reference to the United States’ Establishment Clause, 
discusses what he refers to as the “any more than” argument: 
[T]he argument typically goes, if practices such as the Pledge of  
Allegiance to a nation “under God,” legislative prayer, the invocation to 
God prior to court proceedings, and the Christmas holiday are 
permissible notwithstanding the Establishment Clause, then surely the 
practice at hand (be it a nativity scene, commencement invocation, or 
some other governmental practice)—which does not advance religion 
“any more than” these accepted practices—must also pass muster under 
the Establishment Clause.36 
Applying this logic to ceremonial deisms contained in a constitution (as 
opposed to a statute or executive practice), courts could conceivably find that 
symbolic references serve as a limiting principle to broader anti-establishment 
clauses or that they even affirmatively align the country with a religious 
viewpoint.37 
Of the new constitutions examined for this study, twenty contained 
ceremonial deisms. This set of twenty was not identical with the set that 
contained religious references in their preambles, though there was substantial 
overlap with twelve countries’ constitutions containing both preambular religious 
references and ceremonial deisms. This also means that twenty-six of the forty 
new constitutions examined in this study make some symbolic reference to 
religious concepts. The next section of this Article examines constitutional 
provisions that establish religion in a far more substantive sense. 
C.  Established Religion 
This section examines constitutional provisions that establish religion in a far 
more substantive sense than ceremonial deisms. The concept of an established 
 
34. Compare Epstein, supra note 27, at 2147 (condemning requirement of religious oaths for trial jurors 
and witnesses); id. at 2094–2096. 
35. See Rex Adhar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49 MCGILL L.J. 
635, 642 (2004) (“Religious establishment may end at the point of symbolic acknowledgment, with no further 
translation of religious doctrine into public policy and institutions.”). 
36. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2086. 
37. But cf. Richard H. Jones, “In God We Trust” and the Establishment Clause, 31 J. CHURCH AND 
STATE 381, 405 (1989) (“[S[ymbolism by its very nature cannot be neutral between religions. There are no 
generic religious symbols or ceremonies common to all religions.”). 
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religion is by no means self-defining, and there is widespread disagreement over 
exactly when a religion is considered established.38 As M.H. Ogilvie explains, 
“‘Establishment’ is not and never has been a legal term of art. There is no 
comprehensive body of case law purporting to define it, nor have many legal 
writers attempted to do so. . . . The concept, then, is vague, imprecise, and ever- 
changing.”39 Instead of attempting to craft a catchall definition, it appears to be 
fruitful to conceive of establishment as involving three distinct aspects, each of 
which is a continuum.40 First, there is the distinction “between ‘earthed’ or ‘low’ 
establishment” (where a particular religion has a “daily on-the-ground presence 
. . . in community life”) and “high” establishment, which refers to a religion’s 
political or “constitutional status.”41 Second, there is the distinction between 
“formal” establishment (reflected in statutory or constitutional guarantees) and 
“de facto” establishment (reflected in raw political influence and, potentially, 
legislation that implicitly favors that religion).42 Finally, there is the distinction 
between “weak” and “strong” establishments. The former consists of the 
government supporting (through monetary grants or favorable legislation) a 
particular religion, whereas the latter consists of restraints on the non-established 
religions.43 
This Article examines establishment only in the “high” and “formal” sense, 
as “low” or “de facto” establishment falls outside the scope of a study of 
constitutional provisions. Both “weak” preferences for a particular religion and 
“strong” burdens on non-established religions have been considered as 
establishments for this project as have clear statements aligning the country with 
a particular faith or faiths regardless of whether those statements are 
implemented with tangible consequences.44 
According to these criteria, eleven of the forty new constitutions studied 
could be considered to have established religions. Eight establish solely Islam, 
two establish solely Buddhism, and one gives primary establishment to 
Buddhism while also establishing Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism. 
 
38. M.H. Ogilvie, What is a Church by Law Established? 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 179, 195–96 (1990). 
39. Id. 
40. See Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 35, at 641–45 (discussing the differences between low and high 
establishment, formal and defacto establishment, and weak and strong establishment). 
41. Id. at 641. 
42. Id. at  643. 
43. See id. at 644–45 (describing the various perks that a religious organization might be privy to in a 
weak system and using the Taleban’s Ministry for Suppression of Vice and Promotion of Virtue as an example 
in a strong system). 
44. In other words, as an exercise in comparative law, this project is formalist rather than functionalist in 
nature. See generally Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1228–30 (1998) (noting that several ways to analyze different constitutions include functionalism, expressivism, 
and bricolage and explaining these three approaches in detail); Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295, 1298 (1996) (explaining the formalist approach to constitutional analysis). 
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The degree of establishment varies amongst the constitutions studied and it is 
worth examining a few of them in more detail to illustrate this point. 
The Myanmar Constitution represents a case of multiple establishments listed 
above. It articulates the establishments as follows: 
The Union recognizes [the] special position of Buddhism as the faith 
professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union. . . .The 
Union also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism as the 
religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of 
this Constitution. . . .The Union may assist and protect the religions it 
recognizes to its utmost.45 
Thus, we see the concept of “recognition” tied to permission for the 
government to “assist” and “protect” those religions.46 This would appear to 
embrace special privileges for favored religions while not necessarily burdening 
disfavored religions.47 
The 2011 Interim Constitution of Libya, authored by the Transitional 
National Council, provides a very recent example of Backer’s point that “[s]ome 
states conflate legal and religious systems together.”48 The first Article of that 
Constitution states: “Islam is the Religion of the State and the principal source of 
legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Shari’a).”49 The Libyan Constitution, in its 
current form, contains no further guidance on how Islam or Islamic jurisprudence 
will be incarnated into governing structures.50 
Contrast that to the pervasive role of Islam given in almost every major 
aspect of the Constitution of the Maldives: 
P  The legislative assembly “shall not pass any law that contravenes 
any tenet of Islam.”51 
P  Every citizen is given the affirmative obligation “to preserve and 
protect the State religion of Islam. . . .”52 
 
45. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR May 29, 2008, arts. 361–63. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. An interesting aspect of some of these constitutions, one that will be discussed more in 
subsequent sections, is that the same constitutions that establish religions often simultaneously purport to be 
secular and/or guarantee religious freedom. 
48. Backer, supra note 5, at 92; CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF LIBYA Feb. 7, 2011, art. 1. The 
Libyan Congress has not ratified the constitution. Id.  
49. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF LIBYA Feb. 7, 2011, art. 1.  
50. See generally id. (lacking any further discussion on the interaction between Islam and the Libyan 
government). Intisar Rabb has written an interesting article differentiating between types of constitutionalization of 
Islamic law. See Intisar Rabb, “We the Jurists”: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA.  J. CONST. LAW 527, 
531 (2008). 
51. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES Aug. 7, 2008, arts. 70(c), 10(b). 
52. Id. art. 67(g). 
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P  All rights and freedoms provided for in the Constitution may not 
operate “in a manner that is . . . contrary to any tenet of Islam. . . .”53 
P  The President or Vice-President may be removed from office for 
“direct violation of a tenet of Islam[.]”54 
P  Judges must consider Shari’ah law in any case where “the 
Constitution or the law is silent. . . .”55 
P  No non-Muslim may become a citizen of the Maldives.56 
P  No person may be elected to the legislative assembly, the presidency, 
cabinet, or the judiciary unless that person is both Muslim and “a 
follower of a Sunni school of Islam[.]”57 
P  Education “shall strive to inculcate obedience to Islam [and] instil 
[sic] love for Islam. . . .”58 
The Constitution of the Maldives thus appears to be a perfect demonstration 
of theocratic constitutionalism.59 If religious references in preambles, ceremonial 
deisms, and established religions are placed into the broad category of 
constitutions trending towards theocratic constitutionalism, this study would 
indicate that twenty-eight of the forty constitutions studied would fit into that 
approach to a greater or lesser degree. However, as we shall see in the next 
sections, it is a mistake to see theocratic constitutionalism as necessarily 
operating to the exclusion of liberal constitutionalism. In fact, the two approaches 
are often incarnated side-by-side in the same constitutional text. 
D.  Religious Freedom 
There is no doubt that freedom of religion has become one of the most 
widespread rights to be recognized in constitutional documents: out of the 
constitutions in force as of 2006, 97% contained such a provision.60 Like most of 
the concepts discussed in this Article, “freedom of religion” is not self-
explanatory, and its meaning is likely to depend on context and judicial 
 
53. Id. art. 16(a). 
54. Id. art. 100(a)(1). 
55. Id. art. 142. 
56. Id. art. 9(d). 
57. Id. arts. 73(a)(3), 109(b), 130(a)(3), 149(b)(1). 
58. Id. art. 36(c). 
59. See supra notes 52–58.  
60. Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 1200. 
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interpretation.61 Perhaps in its most common interpretation, freedom of religion 
protects against coercion: “Coercion either prevents the exercise of a particular 
religion or forces compliance with a religious observance or an activity that is 
perceived by some as having religious significance.”62 
It should come as no surprise that the new constitutions studied for the 
present Article are very similar in this respect to the larger number examined in 
Law and Versteeg’s study: thirty-eight of the forty (95%) contain freedom of 
religion guarantees.63 The only exceptions were the Constitution of the Maldives64 
and the Constitution of Comoros (which does not contain a bill of rights).65 As a 
crucial aspect of liberal constitutionalism, freedom of religion has become almost 
omnipresent, at least in a formal sense. 
E.  Equal Protection of Religion 
A similar result is obtained when examining the presence of equality 
guarantees that specifically reference religion. Thirty-five of the forty 
constitutions studied for this project contain such provisions, usually as part of a 
longer list of characteristics that are protected from discrimination. The only 
exceptions were Afghanistan, Morocco, and the Maldives (each with Islam as an 
established religion),66 Comoros,67 and Montenegro (which broadly guarantees 
“equal protection of . . . rights and liberties” without mentioning religion 
specifically).68 As with freedom of religion, equality guarantees appear to be part 
of what Law and Versteeg recognize as “the emergence of a core set of 
constitutional rights that are generic to the vast majority of national 
constitutions.”69 
 
61. See, e.g., Denise J. Doyle, Religious Freedom in Canada, 26 J. CHURCH & STATE 413, 413 (1984) 
(“Religious freedom, like religion itself, is not fixed or static, but is a developing concept.”). 
62. Id. at 433. 
63. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 1200 (finding that 97% of constitutions in force since 2006 
contain provisions regarding religious freedom). 
64. See supra Part IV.C. 
65. LA CONSTITUTION COMORIENNE Dec. 23, 2001 (Comoros), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ 
en/details.jsp?id=8667 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
66. THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004; CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES 
Aug. 7, 2008; THE CONSTITUTION OF MOROCCO Sept 13, 1996. 
67. LA CONSTITUTION COMORIENNE Dec. 23, 2001 (Comoros), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ 
en/details.jsp?id=8667 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
68. CONSTITUTION OF MONTENEGRO Oct. 19, 2007, art. 19. 
69. Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 1170. 
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F.  Establishment Clause70 
Along with guaranteeing individual religious freedom and religious equality, 
one of the hallmarks of liberal constitutionalism in the area of religion is a 
commitment to having a state that is officially secular.71 As Benjamin Berger puts 
it: 
The term ‘secular’ or the declaration that we live in a ‘secular state’ is 
proposed as the main conceptual means by which Western Liberal 
societies deal with the expression of religious conscience. Secularism is 
understood as a societal tool that has the ability to reconcile competing 
claims to ultimate authority, to confine the influence of religion on state 
power, and to limit actions based on personal conscience.72 
When applied as a restriction or requirement on government activity, the 
term “secular” is by no means self-defining. It is often interpreted as requiring 
state neutrality towards religion, but the concept of neutrality generates 
additional ambiguity and debate.73 Douglas Laycock, for example, distinguishes 
between “formal” neutrality, which forbids only explicit religious classifications 
in law-making74 from “substantive” neutrality, which “require[s] government to 
minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief 
 
70. The term “establishment clause” can be a misnomer and may be worth clarifying. In the U.S., the 
term “establishment clause” will be taken to mean a provision separating government and religion. See, e.g., 
McCreary Count v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (plurality) (“When the government acts with the 
ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of 
official religious neutrality….”). In non-U.S. or conceptual contexts, it could be taken to mean a provision that 
does the exact opposite by affirmatively linking government and religion. But cf. Kurt T. Lash, Five Models of 
Church Autonomy: An Historical Look at Religious Liberty Under the United States Constitution in CHURCH 
AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 304 (Gerhard Robbers, ed., 2001) (describing “Religious 
Establishment” as a type of church-government relationship wherein “government regulates on the basis of 
religious truth. Churches are not autonomous but are subject to state regulation directed towards the end of 
encouraging true, and discouraging false religion.”). I have often affixed the preface “anti-” or “non-” before 
“establishment clause” to help avoid this ambiguity. See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational 
Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 994 (2012) (defining “nonestablishment”); David M. Estes, 
Justice Sotomayor and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Which Antiestablishment Standard Will Justice 
Sotomayor Endorse?, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 525, 526 (2010) (discussing the “antiestablishment 
principle”). 
71. See, e.g., Benjamin Berger, The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the Liberal 
State, 17 CANADIAN J. LAW & SOC’Y 39, 49 (2002). 
72. Id. 
73. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 994 (1990) (“Those who think neutrality is meaningless have a point. We can agree on 
the principle of neutrality without having agreed on anything at all. From benevolent neutrality to separate but 
equal, people with a vast range of views on church and state have all claimed to be neutral.”); Michael Paulsen, 
supra note 4, at 333 (“A statement such as ‘the state should be neutral’ is completely vacuous; it says nothing 
about that with respect to which the state is supposed to be neutral.”). 
74. Laycock, supra note 73, at 999. 
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or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.”75 The 
concept of non-establishment is more controversial than that of freedom of 
religion and equal protection of religion, with non-coercive support for religion 
being seen as acceptable in some eyes76 despite being arguably barred by the non-
establishment principle.77 
Despite disagreement over how it should be applied in practice, the non-
establishment principle has shown recent popularity in constitution-making, as 
twenty-four of the forty new constitutions studied for this project include 
provisions incorporating it. Ten of those simply state that the country is 
“secular,”78 and thus invite further political and judicial exploration of how that 
broad term should be applied in practice. Another popular choice is the simple 
and straightforward one demonstrated by the Transitional Constitution of South 
Sudan: “Religion and State shall be separate.”79 The Constitution of Madagascar 
contains a more specific and detailed provision: 
The State affirms its neutrality with regard to different religions. The 
secular characteristic of the Republic rests on the principle of separation 
of the activities of the State from that of religious institutions and their 
representatives. The State and religious institutions are completely 
forbidden to commingle their respective domains. The State may neither 
subsidize nor finance religious institutions. No Department Head or 
Member of the Legislature may take part in the direction of a religious 
institution, under penalty of being disqualified by the High Constitutional 
Court or of being stripped of his office or his responsibilities.80 
As an aspect of liberal constitutionalism, non-establishment guarantees are 
less prevalent in new constitutions than freedom of religion or equal protection of 
religion guarantees.81 However, when viewed solely in comparison to the number 
of new constitutions establishing religion, it appears that more than twice as 
 
75. Id. at 1001. 
76. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, Does the Establishment Clause Matter? Non-Establishment Principles 
in the United States and Canada, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 451, 451 (2002) (comparing “accommodationist” versus 
“separationist” views of the Establishment Clause). 
77. But cf. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality 
and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 297 (1987) (“The principal kind of evil against which 
the establishment clause protects is institutional, not individual. Governmental action violating the clause 
generally involves some form of support for religion. But the religion so benefited is not injured, and in any 
event is unlikely to complain about such support; and nonadherents to the religion may be hard pressed to show 
any concrete injury which they personally have suffered.”). 
78. See supra Table 1. 
79. TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN July 11, 2011, art. 8(1); see also 
CONSTITUTION OF MONTENEGRO Oct. 19, 2007, art. 14 (“Religious communities shall be separated from the 
state.”). 
80. PROJET DE CONSTITUTION, art. 4 (Madag.) (translated from French to English by the author). 
81. See supra Table 1. 
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many constitutions separate religion and government than explicitly link them 
together.82 Fears of theocratic constitutionalism sweeping the globe are thus 
misplaced,83 even if theocratic constitutionalism may be perceived as a viable 
alternative to liberal constitutionalism. 
G.  Analysis 
For the purposes of this study, theocratic constitutionalism is the process of 
linking religion to the authority of governing bodies through constitutional 
provisions. Three types of provisions were categorized as falling under the 
umbrella of theocratic constitutionalism: preambular references, ceremonial 
deisms, and explicit establishments of religion. Of the forty constitutions 
examined, twenty-eight (70%) contained provisions falling into one or more of 
these categories. The actual legal effect of preambles and ceremonial deisms 
depends very much on the interpretation and weight that the judiciary affords to 
them; they may view them as either purely symbolic or, in contrast, as hooks 
upon which elaborate doctrinal constructions can be hung. The presence of 
provisions explicitly establishing one or more religions, which occurred in about 
one fourth of the constitutions studied, are likely to have far greater effect on 
members of non-favored religions. This is a phenomenon that may be feared by 
advocates of religious liberty and liberal constitutionalism, as it points to a 
continuance or a resurgence of religious fundamentalism at the cost of individual 
rights. The fact that a sizable majority of these provisions establish Islam might 
lead some to reinterpret theocratic constitutionalism as a euphemism for Islamic 
constitutionalism. 
Liberal constitutionalism, as it relates to religion, was understood for this 
project as to embody elements of respect for religious conscience, equality and 
autonomy of religious institutions and their followers, and state neutrality 
towards religion. Three specific types of constitutional provisions were 
categorized under this broad approach: freedom of religion, equal protection of 
religion, and non-establishment. Freedom of religion was almost unanimously 
adopted by the constitutions examined, as was equal protection of religion. 
Although not as prevalent as the other two categories placed under the umbrella 
of liberal constitutionalism, the principle of non-establishment was reflected in 
well over half of the constitutions studied. Taken together, every constitution 
studied reflected at least one element of liberal constitutionalism except for two: 
 
82. It is interesting to compare the percentage of new constitutions incorporating anti-establishment 
clauses (59%) and established religions (26%) in this study with the percentage of all constitutions in force as of 
2006 in Law and Versteeg’s study: 34% and 22%, respectively. Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 1163, 1201–
02 Note that there is a period of overlap between the time frames of the two studies. Id. 
83. Hirschl, supra note 5, at 1183 (“[P]opulist academic and media accounts in the West tend to portray 
the spread of religious fundamentalism in the developing world as a near-monolithic, ever-accelerating, and all-
encompassing phenomenon.”). 
_03_PATRICK_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:40 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
919 
Comoros, which has no bill of rights at all,84 and the Maldives, which was the 
clearest example of a country embracing theocratic constitutionalism.85 Twenty-
three of the forty (58%) new constitutions examined included provisions 
reflecting all three categories. 
If liberal constitutionalism and theocratic constitutionalism are 
conceptualized as competing ideologies for nations to incorporate during 
constitution making, is there a clear winner and loser between the two? Any 
attempt to take a binary approach in answering that question would have to 
grapple with the reality that almost all of the new constitutions have elements of 
theocratic constitutionalism and liberal constitutionalism.86 Instead of 
conceptualizing the two ideologies as mutually exclusive, the drafters of most of 
the new constitutions studied for this project have chosen to view them as 
complementary. This convergence between theocratic and liberal 
constitutionalism is not necessarily sound from either a conceptual or practical 
viewpoint. For example, how can a constitution logically establish one religion 
while simultaneously guaranteeing religious equality, or proclaim that the state is 
secular while simultaneously incorporating religious references in oaths for 
public office? Nonetheless, there is substantial overlap: of the eleven countries 
with established religions, ten contain some element of liberal constitutionalism. 
Of the twenty-four countries with non-establishment clauses, twelve contain an 
element of theocratic constitutionalism. Whether for good or ill, most framers of 
recent constitutions perceive religion and rights as at least partially compatible 
rather than contradictory. 
IV. LIMITATIONS 
Conclusions about constitutionalism reached solely after a study of formal 
textual provisions have obvious limitations. 
First, the content of those provisions may have little actual relation to legal 
and political reality. As Backer notes, “[t]here may well be significant 
differences between constitutions in theory and in practice. Constitutions can be a 
sham.”87 Even if not a “sham” per se, the broad and often ambiguous phrases 
used to indicate the proper relationship between religion and the state are 
susceptible to various interpretations that leave extensive power in the hands of 
judges and politicians. In a related fashion, the “on-the-ground” reality will 
depend not only on how the government acts, but on how religious institutions 
 
84. LA CONSTITUTION COMORIENNE Dec. 23, 2001 (Comoros), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8667 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
85. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES Aug. 7, 2008. 
86. See supra Table 1. 
87. Backer, supra note 5, at 94 n.39. See also Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 1169 (“Sometimes, 
constitutions neither constrain nor even describe the actual operation of the state.”). 
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conceive of their role.88 “No religion is monolithic, and religion is far too varied 
and complex to allow for any simplistic generalizations about how faith and 
politics will interact.”89 However, to whatever degree constitutions reflect the 
values and aspirations of their makers, they provide insight on what those makers 
thought worthy of including in their country’s foundational document.90 An 
examination of formal constitutional texts, such as the one performed in this 
study, is the first step in determining whether rhetoric matches reality. And more, 
it is impossible to determine whether reality matches rhetoric in constitutionalism 
unless an examination of formal texts are a part of the study.91 
Second, this study has treated the constitution of each country as if it were of 
equal importance to that of any other country. The reality, of course, is far more 
complex than that, as the foundational law that governs millions in Iraq,92 for 
example, holds ramifications different than that of the law governing the 54,000 
residents of the Cayman Islands.93 Existing constitutions often serve as templates 
for future drafters in other countries to adopt as their own, and therefore the 
choices made by regional powers or allied nations may prove more influential to 
the long-term trend of constitutionalism than the choices made by isolated 
outliers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article was to examine the role of religion in recent 
constitutional drafting. As a lens for analysis, the competing ideologies of liberal 
and theocratic constitutionalism were chosen. Three common categories of 
constitutional provisions relating to religion were articulated for each ideology. 
Every constitution enacted since the year 2000 was read and its provisions 
relating to religion were then sorted into one of those categories for further 
analysis. Analysis indicated that liberal constitutionalism and theocratic 
constitutionalism should not necessarily be conceived of as mutually-exclusive 
ideologies that are either wholly embraced or wholly discarded by modern 
constitution makers. Instead, elements of both approaches could be found in the 
majority of new constitutions. 
 
88. See Adhar & Leigh, supra note 35, at 640–41 (explaining the different definitions of establishment). 
89. David Blaikle and Diana Ginn, Religious Discourse in the Public Square, 16 CONST. F. 37, 42 
(2006).  
90. Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 1170. 
91. Id. at 1169 (“To recognize that some constitutions are shams merely begs a host of further questions, 
none of which can be tackled without a systematic understanding of what the world’s constitutions actually 
say.”). 
92. The World Factbook: Iraq, CIA (July 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/cj.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
93. The World Factbook: Cayman Islands, CIA (July 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/cj.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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Some have viewed the rise of theocratic constitutionalism in the following 
light:  
In a sense, with these challenges the great universalist constitutional projects 
of Anglo-European society come full circle. Having spent the greater part of the 
last four centuries unmaking quasi-governmental systems of religious law, the 
West is now confronted with globalizing political systems grounded in religion 
as fully formed politico-legal systems.94 
Those of us committed to the secular nature of liberal constitutionalism may 
be justifiably concerned when theocratic constitutionalism is seen as a legitimate 
alternative in the eyes of some new constitution makers. However, this concern 
should be tempered with the knowledge that the liberal constitutional project has 
certainly not been a complete failure: all but the most zealous and hardened 
theocracies guarantee, at least formally, the rights of freedom of religion and 
equal protection of religion.95 Whether this seemingly paradoxical attempt to 
merge liberal and theocratic constitutionalism together has any hope of success is 
a question that only time and the judges faced with the unenviable task 
reconciling the two approaches can hope to answer.96 
 
 
94. Backer, supra note 14. 
95. See supra Table 1.  
96. Hirschl, supra note 5, at 1200 (“A common strategy for addressing some of the difficulties presented 
in the ongoing friction between traditional religious outlooks and principles of modern constitutionalism is the 
construction of constitutional courts armed with judicial review powers.”). Hirschl’s article discusses this issue 
in more detail through an analysis of the highest courts of six “constitutional theocracies” operating under older 
constitutions. Id. at 1206. 
